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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Mark Robinson, an inmate in the custody of 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections (DOC) at the State 
Correctional Institution at Rockview (SCI Rockview), appeals 
the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of Lieutenant 
Charles Fink on his excessive force claim. The District Court 
held that Robinson failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
prior to filing suit as required by the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (PLRA). Because we agree with Robinson that his 
attempts to avail himself of SCI Rockview’s administrative 
processes and the prison’s noncompliance with its own 
deadline satisfied the PLRA, we will vacate and remand.1 
I 
 On October 9, 2009, Lieutenant Fink escorted 
Robinson from the prison showers to his cell. Upon removing 
his handcuffs, Fink allegedly twisted Robinson’s left arm 
“real hard” and said, “since today is my last day, I wanted to 
leave you with a present.” App. 312. Robinson felt pain in his 
arm and shoulder and submitted a sick call request the next 
day. Robinson was prescribed medication but continued to 
experience pain in the months that followed.  
                                                 
1 We thank John Jacobus, Linda Bailey, and Timothy 
Work of Steptoe & Johnson for their pro bono representation 
of Robinson in this appeal.  
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 At the time of Robinson’s injury, the DOC had two 
policies in place governing the reporting of abuse by inmates: 
the Inmate Abuse Allegation Monitoring Policy (Abuse 
Policy) and the Inmate Grievance System Policy (Grievance 
Policy). Under the Abuse Policy, an inmate could raise a 
dispute in one of three ways: 
 (1) “report it verbally or in writing to any staff 
member” 
 (2) “file a grievance in accordance with [the Grievance 
Policy]” or 
 (3) “report it in writing to the Department’s Office of 
Professional Responsibility (OPR).” 
App. 391. In other words, Robinson could have brought his 
complaint to the attention of prison authorities either by 
reporting it to a staff member or the OPR (and remain under 
the strictures of the Abuse Policy), or by filing a grievance in 
accordance with the Grievance Policy. As we shall explain, 
Robinson pursued both administrative channels. 
A 
 At the time Robinson filed his claims, the DOC’s 
Abuse Policy provided that once an inmate reported abuse, all 
subsequent procedures were to be conducted at the initiative 
of the prison administration. The Abuse Policy also stated 
that when a complaint of abuse is received, a prison staff 
member “shall complete” Form DC-121 (Report of 
Extraordinary Occurrence – Part 3, Employee Report of 
Incident). App. 394. That form then must be distributed to a 
supervisor and the facility’s Security Office. Once the form is 
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received by the Security Office, the incident “shall be 
investigated and an investigative report shall be compiled” for 
submission to OPR. App. 395. OPR is tasked with reviewing 
the Security Office’s findings for integrity and thoroughness, 
and remanding the matter to the Facility Manager if further 
investigation is required. If the matter is remanded, the 
Facility Manager has 30 days to conduct a follow-up 
investigation, address OPR’s concerns, and resubmit the 
report. Once OPR accepts the matter, it has 30 working days 
to complete its own review and respond to the inmate in 
writing.  
 The record shows that Robinson filed two written 
reports to staff members detailing his excessive force claim 
against Fink in accordance with the Abuse Policy. On 
October 9, he submitted Form DC-135A (Inmate’s Request to 
Staff Member) in which he described the incident, indicated 
that his shoulder was injured, and asked the Unit Manager to 
investigate the matter. On October 10, he filed a Sick Call 
Request in which he again described the incident and 
requested medical attention. Other than confirming that 
Robinson received a medical assessment and medication, the 
record fails to show that anyone at SCI Rockview timely 
followed up on Robinson’s written reports or responded to 
either complaint of abuse.   
B 
 The DOC’s Grievance Policy was more formal than its 
Abuse Policy and provided the following process. To initiate 
a claim, an inmate must file Form DC-804, Part 1 with the 
Facility Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days of an 
incident. The inmate must sign and date the form and include 
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a short description of the incident and other basic 
information.  
 The Facility Grievance Coordinator “shall assign a 
tracking number” and, if the form is compliant, must 
“designate[] a staff member to serve as the Grievance 
Officer” for its resolution. App. 402–03. “When the 
Grievance Officer submits the grievance for formal 
resolution, he/she shall provide a written response to the 
inmate within 10 working days of receipt of the grievance.” 
App. 403 (emphasis removed). If the investigation requires 
more time, the Facility Manager may authorize a 10-day 
extension, in which case “the inmate shall be advised in 
writing.” App. 404.  
 If the grievance is denied, the inmate may appeal to the 
Facility Manager within 10 working days of the date he 
received his written response. The inmate cannot appeal prior 
to receiving a response, however. If the appeal is denied, the 
inmate may appeal a second time to the Secretary’s Office of 
Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA) within 15 working 
days. SOIGA must then respond with a final resolution.  
 The record shows that Robinson filed Form DC-804, 
Part 1 on October 21 (12 days after his alleged injury). 
Robinson described the incident, noted that he was injured by 
Fink, requested relief, and mentioned that he had submitted 
an earlier report pursuant to the Abuse Policy. He also signed 
and dated the form.  
 Facility Grievance Coordinator Jeffrey Rackovan 
received the form, signed it on October 27, assigned it 
Grievance Number 294032, and made two notations: “Capt. 
Eaton 11/3” and “Due 11/10.” App. 312. Consistent with the 
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Grievance Policy, these notations indicate that Captain Lynne 
Eaton was to serve as Robinson’s Grievance Officer and that 
she had to respond by November 10.   
 November 10 came and went and Robinson received 
no response. After hearing nothing from Eaton during 
November or December, on January 8, 2010, Robinson 
submitted Form DC-135A to Rackovan, informing him that: 
he had not received a response; he knew it “was due 
November 10, 2009;” and he was “in need of a response for 
administrative exhaustion.” App. 98.  
 After 10 more days passed without word from the 
prison, Robinson submitted another DC-135A to Rackovan, 
stating that he took SCI Rockview’s failure to respond “as a 
sign that [the prison was] refusing to process” his grievance 
and that he would “proceed to the next level of appeal.” App. 
88.  
 A week later, in a final attempt to spur a response from 
the prison, Robinson submitted another Form DC-135A—this 
time to Eaton. Therein Robinson referenced his grievances, 
noted that Eaton had missed the November 10 deadline, and 
stated “[i]f I do not receive a response to each Grievance or 
this request slip by you, by the date of February 1, 2010, I 
will consider that a denial of the two Grievances. And I shall 
proceed from there.” App. 86. Robinson received no response 
by February 1. 
II 
 On February 5, 2010, Robinson filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania asserting several claims against approximately 
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30 prison officials, including his excessive force claim against 
Fink.  
A 
 On March 17, 2010—more than four months after 
Eaton’s November 10 deadline and roughly six weeks after 
Robinson filed suit—SCI Rockview responded to Robinson’s 
grievance against Fink.2 In that response, Eaton denied 
Robinson’s claim, but her findings referenced a different 
incident from the arm-twisting episode of which he had 
complained.3  
 That same day, Robinson submitted another Form DC-
135A, this time appealing Eaton’s denial to the Facility 
Manager. He noted that: her response was submitted “far 
beyond” her November 10 deadline; he was “never 
interviewed or examined” by Eaton during the course of her 
investigation; and “her response reference[d] a totally 
different matter,” indicating a lack of “due diligence.” App. 
314. On March 24, Robinson’s appeal was denied by SCI 
Rockview’s Superintendent.  
                                                 
2 In their briefing, counsel for Appellee does not 
provide any explanation or justification for the protracted 
delay in responding to Robinson’s grievance and complaints 
of abuse. 
3 The response discussed an incident in which 
Robinson “attempt[ed] to commit suicide” and was “removed 
from [his] cell” and “placed in the processing area . . . to be 
assessed by medical.” App. 313. It concluded that “Lt. Fink 
denies using any excessive force and there is no evidence to 
indicate otherwise.” Id. 
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  Robinson timely appealed to SOIGA. SOIGA 
remanded the matter and Rackovan provided a revised 
response. Rackovan again denied Robinson’s claim, however, 
citing Fink’s denial of the allegations and the fact that 
Robinson’s medical report indicated no visible injury and that 
pain medication was provided to him.  
 Robinson appealed again to SOIGA, which issued a 
Final Appeal Decision on July 26 upholding the denial of his 
grievance.  
B 
 On January 16, 2014, the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation dismissing 
almost all of Robinson’s claims. However, the Court 
overruled the Magistrate Judge’s dismissal of his excessive 
force claim against Fink, finding that “neither Defendants nor 
[the Magistrate Judge] addressed it.” App. 23. The Court 
remanded the matter for further consideration, asking the 
parties to brief the issue of “whether [Robinson] exhausted 
his administrative remedies” with regard to his claim against 
Fink. App. 24. 
 The Magistrate Judge issued a second Report and 
Recommendation on May 6, 2014. He concluded that 
Robinson had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior 
to filing suit with respect to his excessive force claim since 
“Robinson elected to bring [his suit] before receiving a final 
decision on his grievance.” App. 7. The Magistrate Judge 
reasoned: 
Regarding Grievance No. 294032, Robinson 
received responses to this grievance, and was in 
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the process of pursuing appeals of unfavorable 
rulings during and after the time he initiated this 
lawsuit. Although there may have been some 
delays at the institutional level in the processing 
of Robinson’s grievances, we do not find that 
the grievance process was essentially rendered 
unavailable to Robinson and, therefore, disagree 
with Robinson’s assertion that he should be 
excused from the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirements with respect to his claims against 
Lieutenant Fink. 
App. 20–21. The District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s second report and Robinson filed this timely appeal. 
III 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review de novo the District Court’s determination that 
Robinson failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Mitchell 
v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003). In doing so, we 
accept the Court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, 
Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013), and 
are mindful that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense 
that Fink must plead and prove, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 
212 (2007). 
IV 
 The question presented is whether the District Court 
erred in concluding that Robinson failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies under the PLRA prior to filing suit. 
The answer to this question depends on whether SCI 
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Rockview’s repeated failure to respond to Robinson’s 
grievance—even after its own deadline had passed and 
multiple follow-up requests were made—rendered the 
prison’s administrative remedies “unavailable” to Robinson 
under the PLRA.  
 The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust prison 
grievance procedures before suing in court. 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e(a). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies 
prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in 
accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ rules that 
are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance 
process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quoting Woodford v. 
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)).  
 In Brown v. Croak, we noted that the PLRA requires 
exhaustion of “available” administrative remedies and 
defined such remedies as those that are “capable of use; at 
hand.” 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Webster’s II, New Riverside 
University Dictionary 141 (1994 ed.)). Accordingly, we held 
that when prison officials “thwart[] [a prisoner’s] efforts to 
exhaust his administrative remedies,” they render them 
“unavailable.” Id. The Supreme Court recently confirmed our 
view. Ross v. Blake, 2016 WL 3128839, at *7 (U.S. June 6, 
2016) (“[A]n inmate is required to exhaust those, but only 
those, grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain 
‘some relief for the action complained of.’”) (quoting Booth 
v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)).  
 In this case, the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s conclusion that Robinson’s efforts to obtain remedies 
were not thwarted because “[he] received responses to [his] 
grievance, and was in the process of pursuing appeals of 
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unfavorable rulings during and after the time he initiated [his] 
lawsuit.” App. 20. The Court also agreed that any “delays at 
the institutional level” were not substantial enough to render 
Robinson’s administrative remedies “unavailable.” Id.  
 Five of our sister courts have held that a prison’s 
failure to timely respond to an inmate’s properly filed 
grievance renders its remedies “unavailable” under the 
PLRA. See, e.g., Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 
996 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Following the lead of the [10th, 7th, 
8th, and 5th] circuits . . . we conclude that administrative 
remedies are exhausted when prison officials fail to timely 
respond to a properly filed grievance.”). For example, in 
Powe v. Ennis, the Fifth Circuit vacated the District Court’s 
dismissal of a prisoner’s claim based on failure to exhaust 
when the prison did not provide a timely response to his 
grievance. 177 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). The 
Court succinctly held: “A prisoner’s administrative remedies 
are deemed exhausted when a valid grievance has been filed 
and the state’s time for responding thereto has expired.” Id. at 
394. The same reasoning drove the result in Foulk v. 
Charrier, in which the Eighth Circuit held that an inmate was 
not required to file a grievance in order to exhaust 
administrative remedies when the prison failed to respond to 
an informal review request that was a prerequisite to his 
ability to file a grievance. 262 F.3d 687, 698 (8th Cir. 2001).   
 Our most relevant opinion is in line with these 
precedents. In Small v. Camden County, an inmate submitted 
two grievances “in compliance with [the prison’s] 
procedures,” but “no decision” was rendered on either of 
them and prison rules required inmates to wait for a decision 
before filing an appeal. 728 F.3d at 273. We reasoned that 
“[b]ecause [the prison’s] procedures did not contemplate an 
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appeal from a non-decision, when [the inmate] failed to 
receive even a response to the grievances . . . much less a 
decision as to those grievances, the appeals process was 
unavailable to him.” Id. 
 Consistent with Small and the unanimous view of the 
Courts of Appeals that have spoken on the matter, we agree 
with Robinson that SCI Rockview rendered its administrative 
remedies unavailable to him when it failed to timely (by its 
own procedural rules) respond to his grievance and then 
repeatedly ignored his follow-up requests for a decision on 
his claim.  
 The record reveals that Robinson pursued his claim 
correctly at every step. He filed his claim under the Grievance 
Policy on the proper form; he included a brief, legible, and 
appropriate description of the incident; he signed and dated 
the form; and he submitted it to the proper prison staff 
member within 15 working days of his injury. Despite this, 
SCI Rockview failed to respond by its self-imposed deadline. 
Even worse, the prison refused to update Robinson on the 
status of his grievance after receiving three requests in 
January asking for a response and threatening suit as a last 
resort. As in Small, filing suit was Robinson’s only method to 
advance his claim since SCI Rockview prohibited inmates 
from filing appeals prior to receiving a decision. App. 404 
(“The Initial Review decision from the Grievance Officer 
must be received by the inmate before any appeal to the 
Facility Manager can be sought.”).  
 The District Court concluded that SCI Rockview’s 
March 17, 2010, response to Robinson—which was provided 
more than four months late and six weeks after Robinson 
filed suit, and did not even address the correct incident—
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rendered the prison’s administrative remedies “available” to 
him under the PLRA. We disagree. Robinson’s decision to 
accept that response in good faith and pursue his claim 
through the remainder of a belated administrative process 
does not rectify the prison’s errors. Cf. Goebert v. Lee Cty., 
510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) (“If we allowed jails 
and prisons to play hide-and-seek with administrative 
remedies, they could keep all remedies under wraps until after 
a lawsuit is filed and then uncover them and proclaim that the 
remedies were available all along.”).4  
Although SCI Rockview did not play hide-and-seek 
with its administrative processes, it did violate those 
processes by failing to respond to Robinson’s grievance until 
more than four months after its own deadline and then 
repeatedly ignoring his requests for a decision. “Operating at 
its best, which it admittedly sometimes does not, a prison 
administrative grievance procedure will afford an inmate with 
a sense of respect. If prison officials treat his claims with 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that had Robinson missed his own 
procedural deadline—for example, by failing to file his 
grievance until 16 days after the alleged incident with Fink—
he might have found himself barred from seeking a judicial 
remedy since it could be argued that he failed to exhaust the 
prison’s administrative procedures. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 
U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance 
with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules 
. . .”). Therefore, it would have been risky for Robinson to 
ignore the prison’s late-filed response and proceed solely in 
federal court. Rather than take that risk, he sensibly decided 
to pursue his grievance when SCI Rockview finally 
responded to it. We reject the prison’s invitation to hold 
Robinson’s diligence against him.  
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seriousness and care, they may well discover that he can be 
easily satisfied.” Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 76 (3d Cir. 
2000). But the converse is also true. If prisons ignore 
grievances or fail to fully investigate allegations of abuse, 
prisoners will feel disrespected and come to believe that 
internal grievance procedures are ineffective.  If prisoners do 
not believe they will get a response from prison 
administration, they will be more likely either to bypass 
internal procedures entirely and file a complaint in federal 
court or use a federal lawsuit to prod prison officials into a 
response, thus taxing the judicial resources that Congress 
meant to conserve by passing the PLRA. Accordingly, we 
hope that the events that transpired in this case are not 
reflective of the way in which SCI Rockview responds to 
inmate grievances generally.    
On these facts, we hold that SCI Rockview rendered 
its administrative remedies “unavailable” to Robinson under 
the PLRA. Consequently, the District Court erred when it 
held that Robinson failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  
V 
 For the reasons stated, we will vacate the District 
Court’s summary judgment in favor of Fink on Robinson’s 
excessive force claim and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
